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THE GATT QUALIFIER: ITS VALIDITY AS A TAX
STANDARD AND ITS EFFECT ON DISC AND
DISC ALTERNATIVES
Since its enactment in 1971, Domestic International Sales Cor-
poration (DISC) legislation' has been attacked as an illegal subsidy
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (GATT or the
I. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 535-53 (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 991-97 (West 1982 & West Supp. 1983)). Under DISC legislation, a United States
exporter can obtain a tax deferral on its export income by creating a DISC and channel-
ing export sales through it. To qualify as a DISC, a corporation must be incorporated
under the laws of any state and must satisfy the following four requirements:
(1) at least 95 percent of its gross receipts consists of qualified export receipts
(I.R.C. § 993(f) defines "gross receipts" as "the total receipts from the sale, lease,
or rental of property held primarily for sale, lease, or rental in the ordinary
course of trade or business, and gross income from all other sources." I.R.C.
§ 993() (1976). "Qualified export receipts" include: "gross receipts from the
sale, exchange or other disposition of export property, . . . gross receipts for
services which are related and subsidiary to any qualified sale, exchange, lease,
rental, or other disposition of export property by such corporation, . . . gross
receipts from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualified export assets
(other than export property) .. . [and] interest on any obligation which is a
qualified export asset. . . ." Id § 993(a)(1). "Qualified export assets" include:
inventory meeting specified requirements, assets used primarily in connection
with the sale, lease, storage, or handling of export property; accounts receivable
arising from DISC transactions; necessary working capital; and stock or securi-
ties of a related foreign export corporation. Id. § 993(b));
(2) the adjusted basis of its qualified export assets equals or exceeds 95 percent
of the sum of the adjusted bases of all of its assets at the close of the taxable year,
(3) it has only one class of stock and the par or stated value of its outstanding
stock is at least $2,500 at all times; and
(4) it has elected to be treated as a DISC and such election is in effect.
Id § 992(a)(1).
DISC profits are not taxed to the DISC itself. Id § 991. Instead, the shareholders
(usually the parent corporation) are taxed to the extent that the DISC income is actually,
or deemed to be, distributed to them as dividends. See id § 995 (West Supp. 1983).
Before the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324, 50 percent of DISC income, whether or not distributed, was taxed currently to the
DISC shareholders. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F)(i) (1976). The tax on the remaining 50% was
deferred until the DISC profits were actually distributed, the shareholder sold his stock,
or the corporation lost its DISC status. Id § 995 (West Supp. 1983). The 1982 Act
increased the deemed dividend distribution from 50% to 57.5% for tax years beginning
after December 31, 1982. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, § 204(a), 96 Stat. 324, 423-24; I.R.C. § 291(a)(4) (West Supp. 1983).
If a DISC's gross export receipts do not increase over a consecutive four-year period
beginning in the seventh calendar year preceding the taxable year, the deferral of tax on
the DISC income is effectively nullified. See I.R.C. § 995(e)(l)-(5) (1976).
For the legislative history of the passage of DISC legislation, see 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1825-2079.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
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General Agreement). In 1976, a GATT Pane 3 issued a series of
Reports4 which found that DISC taxation and certain tax practices
maintained by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands 5 constituted
For the complete text of GATT, as in force March 1, 1969, see 4 GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
(1969). See also Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250 (1967), wherein GATT is defined as "a multilateral
international agreement which is today the principal instrument for the regulation of
world trade." ld On GATT generally, see Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal Aspects
ofa Surprising Institution, I J. WORLD TRADE L. 131 (1967).
3. GATT authorizes a "panel of conciliation" to resolve disputes. GATT, supra
note 2, at art. XXIII(2). The panel selected to review the legality of DISC taxation and
certain tax practices of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands was announced on Febru-
ary 17, 1976 and consisted of the following members: Mr. L.J. Mariadason (Counsellor,
Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka, Geneva), Chairman; Mr. W. Falconer (Director of
Trade Policy, Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington); Mr. F. Forte (Professor of
Public Finance, University of Turin); Mr. T. Gabrielsson (Counsellor of Embassy, Per-
manent Delegation of Sweden to the European Communities, Brussels); and Mr. A.R.
Prest (Professor of Economics of the Public Sector, London School of Economics).
Report of the Panel, UNITED STATES TAx LEGISLATION (DISC), GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (23d Supp.)
98, para. 2 (1977). The Panel met on March 16-18, 1976, June 28-July 1, 1976, and July
26-30, 1976, and concluded its report through a postal procedure. Id at 99, para. 4.
4. Report of the Panel, UNITED STATES TAx LEGISLATION (DISC), GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCU-
MENTS (23d Supp.) 98 (1977) [hereinafter cited as UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION];
Report of the Panel, INCOME TAx PRACTICES MAINTAINED By FRANCE, GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCU-
MENTS (23d Supp.) 114 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TAx PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
FRANCE]; Report of the Panel, INCOME TAx PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY BELGIUM,
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS (23d Supp.) 127 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED
BY BELGIUM]; Report of the Panel, INCOME TAx PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY THE
NETHERLANDS, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (23d Supp.) 137 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TAX PRACTICES
MAINTAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS].
5. The United States, in its complaint against the tax practices of France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands, see infra text accompanying note 16, described the tax practices of
the three countries as follows:
The French income tax system for corporations is based on the territoriality
principle which, in general, taxes income earned in France but not income aris-
ing outside France .... French companies are liable to corporation tax solely
in respect of profits made by enterprises operating in France and of profits taxa-
ble by France under an international double taxation agreement. [Code g6n~ral
des imp~ts, art. 209:1]
Under the territoriality rule as applied by France, profits generated by under-
takings operated abroad are exempt from French taxation. On the other hand, a
French company is not entitled to any foreign tax credit and cannot deduct losses
suffered abroad, apart from exceptions specified below.
If a subsidiary is a purely fictitious corporation located abroad and all its
activities are directed from France, tax is levied in France on total profits for the
reason that all corporations, regardless of nationality or location of the statutory
head office, which have an effective management headquarters in France are
taxable in France.
Ninety-five per cent of dividends from the French or foreign subsidiaries of a
French company is excluded from the profits of the parent corporation. Partici-
pation by the parent in the subsidiary must exceed 10 per cent. [Id, arts. 145,
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export subsidies in violation of article XVI of the General Agree-
216.] This arrangement stems from the desire to avoid double taxation of the
dividends of subsidiaries.
Dealings between French companies and their branches, subsidiaries or asso-
ciated companies in foreign countries must in principle be conducted as if the
companies were independent enterprises, each being regarded as a separate dis-
tinct economic entity ('arm's-length' relationship). [Id, art. 57.]. . . The actual
application of the principle was interpreted in administrative notes in 1959, 1972
and 1973, according to which [French tax] officials are requested to take into
consideration foreign competitive conditions and commercial operations as a
whole, not a single transaction alone ...
In certain cases provision can be made for losses abroad and certain expendi-
tures relating thereto. [id, art. 39 octies A.] Since I January 1973 this treatment
applies only to new establishments, is limited on account of the permitted
amount of the reduction, and is limited to five years in time.
French companies are allowed to set up certain reserves to cover risks in
respect of medium-term credit for sales or projects carried out abroad. [Id,
Annex IV, arts. 4 and 4 bLs]
Exports are excluded from the application of the inflation levy introduced in
France on 1 January 1975. The levy has not been applied in practice. After
having been abolished from 1 September 1975, it was re-established in principle
for 1976 and is to be applied if increases in prices of manufactures exceed 2 per
cent over a period of three months.
TAX PacTIcEs MAINTANED BY FRANCE, supra note 4, at 116-17 (footnote material
placed in brackets).
The Belgian income tax system is based on the principle of worldwide taxation
of residents and on the source principle as far as taxation of non-residents is
concerned.
Therefore, non-residents are only taxed in Belgium on income obtained or
collected by them there. Profits of foreign subsidiaries of Belgium-based corpo-
rations are not taxed by the Belgian authorities, but are subject to the tax juris-
diction of the foreign country in question.
In order to avoid double taxation of sales effected abroad by foreign sales
establishments Belgium introduced the principle of tax relief [which] was . . .
carried into law in 1919 ...
Income obtained from foreign establishments by resident corporations and
which has been taxed abroad is assessed after deduction of foreign tax. Belgian
tax is then applied to it at one quarter of the normal'rate. Evidence that the
profits are both obtained and taxed abroad must be produced. In practice, evi-
dence of foreign taxation is not required in respect of profits obtained through an
establishment located abroad, if it draws up separate accounts. The fact that
certain constituent elements of income may not be taxable or may be tax free in
the foreign country is not generally sufficient justification for refusing to grant
the benefit of Belgian tax reliefs.
As far as sales through foreign sales subsidiaries (permanent equity holdings)
are concerned, Belgium taxes foreign profits therefrom only to the degree that
they are actually distributed to the parent corporation. However, in order to
remedy the effects of cascading taxation of dividends, dividends derived from
subsidiaries which would normally have been taxed are deducted from the tax
base of the recipient to the extent of 95 per cent (or 90 per cent for certain hold-
ing companies) of the net amount received, grossed up by a deemed movable
prepayment of 5 per cent; this system is applicable regardless of the size of the
Belgian corporation's equity holding generating dividends.
A provision in Belgium's Income Tax Code (Article 24), which is of general
scope, lays down that transactions between Belgian enterprises directly or indi-
rectly related to an enterprise established abroad shall be governed by the arm's-
1983]
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ment.6 In December 1981, the GATT Council formally adopted the
1976 Panel Reports, subject to a "qualifer" which recognizes the
legitimacy of territorial systems of taxation.7
length principle. The administration is given much latitude in its application of
this provision.
TAX PRAcTicEs MAINTAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 128-29.
The Netherlands system of levying income tax and corporation tax is that
profits made by an individual or an enterprise should be taxed in the country
where the profits were made. In principle, however, income tax on resident cor-
porations and individuals is levied on the worldwide income. If a treaty provides
for different tax treatment the treaty rules will prevail over Dutch national law,
and if no treaty exists, unilateral relief will be granted through a proportional
reduction in Dutch taxation for foreign-source profits if an income tax is in prin-
ciple due in the foreign country. The portion of profits or income which is not
taxable in the Netherlands is therefore important when determining the tax rate
to be applied to the portion that is taxable in the Netherlands. This means in
practice that for individuals who are subject to a progressive rate of income tax,
the Dutch tax is affected by the amount not taxable in the Netherlands. For
resident corporations this system has effects which are similar to those of the
territoriality principle. One difference between the Dutch system and the territo-
riality system in its pure form is that foreign losses of a permanent establishment
(the concept includes the location of the principal office of management) or
dependent permanent representative are deductible when computing liability to
Dutch tax, provided that tax is in principle due in the foreign country.
This method amounts to a credit, not for foreign, but for Dutch tax on foreign
income, and is the principal method for avoiding double taxation (Royal Decree
providing Unilateral Regulations for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of
1965).
In the Netherlands the taxation of dividends is governed by the territoriality
principle applied to the residence of the person entitled to dividends. As a gen-
eral rule, therefore, no relief from Dutch tax is granted to dividends. However,
the Decree provides a relief for all income earned by a permanent establishment,
which in practice means that dividends can qualify for relief if they are chan-
nelled through a permanent establishment and are subject to tax in the other
country. Under Dutch double taxation agreements these rules apply even if the
other country does not make use of its taxation rights. A 1970 amendment to the
Decree also introduced a special foreign tax credit for interest and royalties paid
to Dutch residents from developing countries.
An 'affiliation privilege', laid down in the Corporation Tax Act of 1969, consti-
tutes an exemption for inter-company dividends and other profits connected with
a substantial participation in ownership (normally 5 per cent) and was enacted to
prevent double taxation of profits when a company receives dividends or other
gains from a qualified company. This privilege is also applicable if a resident
company participates in a foreign company which is formally subject to some
kind of income tax under the laws of a foreign State. The rate of the foreign tax
is immaterial, but liability to foreign local or regional taxes is not sufficient ...
Under Dutch legislation the profits of an enterprise must be calculated in
accordance with 'sound business practice'. There are no administrative guide-
lines for the application of the arm's-length principle.
TAX PRACTIcEs MAINTAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 138-39.
For a detailed analysis of the tax practices of France and the Netherlands, see Cole &
Corette, Foreign Tax Practice Affecting Exports 8-18, 34-39 (July 1982) (available from
Cole & Corette, 1200 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
6. For the relevant text of article XVI, see infra note 21.
7. GA7 Aets on Export Tax Aid Panel Reports, TAX NOTES 1485 (Dec. 14, 1981).
A territorial system of taxation only taxes income generated within the territory of the
GATT QUALIFIER
Although the European Communities (EC) and the United
States agree that the qualifier exonerates the tax practices of France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, the parties disagree about whether
the qualifier legitimizes DISC.8 At the June 1982 GATT Council
meeting, Deputy United States Trade Representative David R. Mac-
donald presented the United States position that DISC is GATT-
legal in light of the qualifier.9 Four months later, however, the Rea-
gan Administration made a commitment before the GATT Council
to modify or replace DISC in order to bring it into conformity with
the General Agreement.' 0
This Note critically analyzes the qualifier and its implications
for the DISC GATT-legality dispute. The Note first reviews the
DISC controversy and the qualifier's invalidation of DISC." Next,
it discusses GATT policy objectives and examines the United States
defense of DISC. The Note argues that the qualifier is an inappro-
priate standard by which to measure the GATT-legality of systems
of taxation, because it legitimizes systems that do not optimally serve
the policy objectives of the General Agreement. Finally, the Note
presents and analyzes various proposals that have been or currently
are being considered as viable alternatives to DISC.
I
HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
In 1973, the EC filed a complaint against DISC before the
GATT Council.12 The EC asked a GATT Panel13 "[t]o find that the
taxing (exporting) country. In contrast, a global system of taxation taxes the world-wide
income of the exporting taxpayer.
8. Statement of the Honorable David R. Macdonald for the United States before
the GATT Council Opposing Adoption of E.C. Draft Decision, at I (June 29, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Macdonald Statement]. Excerpts of Macdonald's speech are
reprinted in The U.S. Defense of DISC Before GAI7, TAX NOTES 269 (July 19, 1982).
The full text is available in Tax Notes Microfiche Data Base, Doc. 82-7501 (July 19,
1982).
9. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 1-9.
10. U.S. 9Will Seek Revised DISC Legislation in Response to Long-Term GAIT Oppo-
sition, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (Oct. 5, 1982).
11. A literal application of the qualifier invalidates DISC. See infra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text. The United States, however, argued that the implicit effect of the
qualifier is to legitimize DISC. See infra notes 44-88 and accompanying text.
12. See UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 98, para. 1.
13. See supra note 3. The Panel apparently adopted the United States' suggestion
that the four complaints about DISC legislation and the income tax practices of France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands be considered together because they raised the same prin-
ciples concerning the application of the GATT. See TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
FRANCE, supra note 4, at 115, para. 6; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY BELGIUM, supra
note 4, at 128, para. 6; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS, supra note
4, at 138, para. 6. The Panel issued its reports on the tax practices of the United States,
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the same date.
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DISC system was incompatible with the relevant clauses of the Gen-
eral Agreement regarding export subsidies."' 4 Canada, in support of
the EC complaint, added that "[t]he Panel should recommend to the
United States that it should terminate the subsidization promptly."S
The United States countered the EC action by filing three simi-
lar complaints against France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The
United States requested the GATT Panel to find "that the tax prac-
tices of France, [Belgium, and the Netherlands] violated article
XVI:4 and that there was therefore aprimafacie case that these prac-
tices were nullifying or impairing benefits accruing to it under the
General Agreement."16
In 1976, after consulting with the EC and the four nations
named in the complaints, the GATT Panel issued its findings.17 The
Panel found that all four nations' tax systems constituted export sub-
sidies under GATT;'8 were therefore covered by the notification
obligation of article XVI: 1; 19 had effects in some cases that were not
in accordance with the four nations' obligations under article
XVI:4; 20 and presented prima facie cases of nullification or impair-
ment of benefits that other Contracting Parties were entitled to
expect under GATT.21
14. UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 99, para. 5.
15. Id
16. TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED By FRANCE, supra note 4, at 115, para. 5. See also
TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED By BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 128, para. 5; TAX PRACTICES
MAINTAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 137-38, para. 5.
17. See UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 99, para. 3; TAX PRAc-
TICES MAINTAINED By FRANCE, supra note 4, at 115, para. 3; TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 127-28, para. 3; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 137, para. 3.
18. UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 112, para. 69; TAX PRAC-
TICES MAINTAINED BY FRANCE, supra note 4, at 125, para. 48; TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 135, para. 35; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 145, para. 35.
19. UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 114, para. 77; TAX PRAC-
TICES MAINTAINED BY FRANCE, supra note 4, at 127-28, para. 57; TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 136, para. 44; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 146-47, para. 44.
20. UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 113, para. 74; TAX PRAC-
TICES MAINTAINED BY FRANCE, supra note 4, at 126, para. 53; TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 136, para. 40; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 146, para. 40.
21. UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 114, para. 80; TAX PRAC-
TICES MAINTAINED BY FRANCE, supra note 4, at 127, para. 58; TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 136, para. 45; TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 147, para. 45.
Article XVI, as cited in the Panel Report, provides in relevant part:
1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form
of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase
exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its
territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent
and nature of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or
1983] GA TT QUALIFIER
In December 1981, the GATT Council formally adopted the
Panel Reports,22 subject to an important qualifier.23 The qualifier
confers GATT-legal status upon certain tax systems that would
otherwise violate article XVI. Specifically, the qualifer provides:
(1) that an exporting country need not tax economic processes
located outside its territorial limits, and (2) that an exporting com-
pany must, for tax purposes, treat its related foreign buyers at arm's-
length.24 In addition, the qualifier expressly permits an exporting
country to adopt measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source
products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circum-
stances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is deter-
mined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is
caused or threatened by any subsidization, the contracting party granting the
subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or par-
ties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting
the subsidization.
4 ... [Clontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any
form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product
for exports at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market ...
GATT, supra note 2, at art. XVI ("Whenever reference is made in this Agreement to the
contracting parties acting jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES." Id
at art. XXV: 1. This Note uses "Contracting Parties" to refer to contracting parties acting
jointly or separately.) For an interpretation of arts. XVI:l & 4, see GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ANALYTICAL INDEX, NOTES ON THE DRAFTING, INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE ARTICLES OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT 83-86
(2d ed. 1966).
22. GA7TActs on Export Tax Aid Panel Reports, TAx NOTES 1485 (Dec. 14, 1981).
23. The qualifier originally had been proposed by the United States as part of its
November 1981 unofficial bilateral settlement with the EC. In that settlement, each party
also unofficially agreed to withdraw its complaint against the other, with a reservation of
the right to renew the challenge at any time. See generally Rumors Ry as GA7TAgain
Schedules DISC Hearing, TAX NOTES 1080 (Nov. 2, 1981); GAYT and DISC Looking
RidiculousZ TAX NOTES 1415 (Dec. 7, 1981).
24. The qualifier provides:
The Council adopts these reports on the understanding that with respect to these
cases, and in general, economic processes (including transactions involving
exported goods) located outside the territorial limits of the exporting country
need not be subject to taxation by the exporting country and should not be
regarded as export activities in terms of Article XVI:4 of the General Agree-
ment. It is further understood that Article XVI:4 requires that arm's-length pric-
ing be observed, i.e., prices for goods in transactions between exporting
enterprises and foreign buyers under their or the same control should for tax
purposes be the price which would be charged between independent enterprises
acting at arm's-length. Furthermore, Article XVI:4 does not prohibit the adop-
tion of measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income.
The U.S. Defense of DISC Before GA4T, supra note 8, at 269.
The two prongs of the qualifier establish requirements that a country must meet to
avoid violating article XVI. First, the qualifier, by negative implication, requires a coun-
try to tax economic processes located within its territorial limits. Second, the qualifier
requires observance of arm's-length pricing between a company and its related foreign
buyers.
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income without violating GATT.25
The United States and the EC agree that the qualifier legiti-
mizes the territorial tax systems of France, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands.26 Those nations' tax systems, which were designed to avoid
double taxation of foreign source income,27 satisfy the qualifier's two
requirements. 28 The systems exempt from taxation only those eco-
nomic processes located outside the territorial limits of the exporting
country and require observance of arm's-length intercompany pric-
ing rules.29 Thus, as applied to the tax systems of France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands, the qualifier removes the article XVI taint and
thereby overrules the 1976 Panel Report findings of GATT
violations.30
The qualifier does not, however, legitimize DISC, because
DISC does not satisfy the qualifier's two requirements. Because a
DISC must be incorporated in the United States,3 1 the economic
processes of a DISC are considered to be located within the United
States. In this respect, DISC activity is not covered by the exclusion
of the first prong of the qualifier.32 In addition, DISC violates the
qualifier's arm's-length requirement.33 The Internal Revenue Code's
intercompany pricing rules,34 which require observance of arm's-
25. Id The third part of the qualifier is merely permissive, because it provides that
countries may adopt measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income.
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 5.
28. See supra note 24.
29. See supra note 5. Although the Belgian system is territorial for non-residents and
global for residents, TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY BELGIUM, supra note 4, at 128,
para. 8, it is still compatible with the qualifier, because the global system taxes economic
processes located within its territory. The first prong of the qualifier is a negative direc-
tive: economic processes located outside the territory of the exporting country need not
be taxed. The Belgian system errs, if at all, on the side of over-taxation. By taxing more
than is dictated by the qualifier, it is not in violation thereof.
Note also that the qualifier's arm's-length requirement is not applied in practice as
strictly as a literal reading of its language might allow. Under the Belgian system, "[t]he
administration is given much latitude in its application of... [the arm's-length] provi-
sion." Id at 129, para. 13. Under the Dutch system, the standard is "'sound business
practice.' There are no administrative guidelines for the application of the arm's-length
principle." TAx PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 4, at 139,
para. 12. In France, administrative officials, in considering adherence to the arm's-length
principle, are "to take into consideration foreign competitive conditions and commercial
operations as a whole, not a single transaction alone." TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY
FRANCE, supra note 4, at 116, para. 12. Thus, DISC's failure to require strict adherence
to the arm's-length principle, see infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text, does not
appear to be a major obstacle to compliance with the qualifier.
30. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note I.
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. Id
34. The Internal Revenue Code provides that:
In any case of two or more ... businesses ... owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may ... allocate gross income,
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length pricing, are inapplicable to sales between a DISC and its
related supplier. Rather, DISC provisions allow a parent company
to sell export property to its DISC at a transfer price which allows
the DISC to earn the greatest of (1) 4% of the qualified export
receipts from the sale of such property by the DISC, plus 10% of the
related export promotion expenses; (2) 50% of the combined taxable
income of such DISC and its related supplier attributable to quali-
fied export receipts, plus 10% of the related export promotion
expenses; or (3) taxable income based upon the sale price actually
charged, if that price is justifiable on an arm's-length basis.35
'Because DISC does not satisfy either prong of the qualifier, the
article XVI taint cannot be removed. Thus, a literal application of
the qualifier reaffirms the 1976 Panel Report finding that DISC vio-
lates GATT.36 In favor of such a literal application, the EC placed a
formal document before the GATT Council in May 1982, requesting
the Council to "recommend, in accordance with the provisions of
[a]rticle XXIII:2 that the United States take appropriate action with-
out delay to bring the DISC legislation into conformity with the pro-
visions of GATT.' '37 In addition, the EC requested $2.3 billion in
compensatory damages allegedly caused by DISC,38 and joined
Canada in raising the DISC issue in the GATT Subsidies Code
forum.39
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such.. . businesses, if he
determines that such. . . allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such. . . businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1976). Under the regulations to § 482:
Where one member of a group of controlled entities.. . sells or otherwise dis-
poses of tangible property to another member of such group. . . at other than an
arm's-length price.. ., the district director may make appropriate allocations
between the seller and the buyer to reflect an arm's length price for such sale or
disposition. An arm's-length price is the price that an unrelated party would
have paid under the same circumstances for the property involved in the con-
trolled sale. Since unrelated parties normally sell products at a profit, an arm's
length price normally involves a profit to the seller.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(1)(i) (1983).
35. I.R.C. §§ 994(a)(l)-(3) (1976). Treas. Reg. § 1.994-1 (1983).
36. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
37. Falkland Islands Crisis Preempts DISC Attack in GA T but EC Taking Hard
Line, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 407, at 192 (May 11, 1982). The EC also
requested the GATT Council to:
recognize that the circumstances characterizing this infringement of the provi-
sions of GATT are very serious, and that the question should remain on the
Council's agenda, with a view to ascertaining whether the action shortly to be
taken by the United States is likely to remedy the situation, and with a view to
any appropriate follow-up.
Id (reprinting the text of the EC request).
38. E. C. Calls for DISC Compensation in GAT 7;, but U.S. Fends Off Decision Until
Fall, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 417, at 597 (July 27, 1982).
39. Sometimes called the "centerpiece" of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (see AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILAT-
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II
GATT POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES
DEFENSE OF DISC
At the June 29, 1982 GATT Council meeting, Deputy United
States Trade Representative David R. Macdonald presented the
United States response to the EC opinion that the qualifier not only
exonerated the tax systems of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
but also strengthened the Panel Report's condemnation of DISC.40
Macdonald neither refuted nor conceded DISC's literal noncon-
formity with the qualifier. Instead, he defended DISC by focusing
upon the system's effect, a factor not accounted for by the qualifier.
An analysis of Macdonald's arguments demonstrates that DISC
conforms with GATT policy objectives.41 This fact, in light of the
qualifier's condemnation of DISC, establishes that the qualifier can
produce results that do not optimally promote GATT policy. In this
respect, the qualifier is an improper standard by which to evaluate a
tax system's GATT-legality.
A. GATT PoLIcY OBJECTIVES
The preamble to the General Agreement expresses its general
purposes and policy objectives. The Contracting Parties are to enter
into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and
to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce." 42
Article XVI:1 implicitly embodies the Contracting Parties' spe-
cific policy regarding the use of subsidies that might block the eco-
nomic growth of the Parties. Article XVI:I controls the use of any
ERAL TRADE NEGOTiAriONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979)), the
"negotiation... of a Code on subsidies/countervailing measures [(Agreement on Inter-
pretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, (Subsidies Code), GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W236, re rinted/n H.R.
Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 257 (1979); and in GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (26th Supp.)
56 (1980)) resulted in the] ... writing of new international rules governing the use of
subsidies ...." Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1447, 1447-50 (1979).
At the April 29-30, 1982 GATT Subsidies Committee meeting, Canada accused the
United States of failing to give article XVI:1 notification (see supra note 21) that DISC is
a subsidy. The United States, speaking through United States Trade Representative gen-
eral counsel Donald deKieffer, responded that DISC is not a subsidy. EC and Canada
Join Forces in Attack on U.S. DISC in GAT Subsidies Forum, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 406, at 139 (May 4, 1982).
40. See Macdonald Statement, supra note 8.
41. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
42. GATT, supra note 2, at Preamble.
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subsidy "which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of
any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its terri-
tory. .. [and which causes or threatens to cause] serious prejudice
to the interests of any other [C]ontracting [P]arty. ... -43 The argu-
ments in defense of DISC are best analyzed in light of these GATT
policy objectives.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION
I Effect of DISC Comparison with a GATT-legal Territorial
System
Macdonald's strongest argument against the EC's condemna-
tion of DISC showed that DISC provides a lesser tax benefit to
exporters than would the use of a qualifier-legitimized territorial tax
system.44 Using an "effects" or "level of taxation" test derived from
conclusions found in the 1976 Panel Reports, 45 Macdonald asserted
that the effect of DISC is the deferral of tax on approximately 17% 4
of the combined income attributable to DISC sales, and that this
deferral percentage is lower than the percentage of income upon
which exemption may be allowed under a territorial tax system.47 He
argued that DISC legislation merely attempts to counteract the
adverse relative effect imposed upon United States exporters by the
pre-DISC tax system,48 and that DISC imposes taxes at least equal
to the taxes that would be imposed if the United States operated
under a territorial tax system.49 Because DISC is less favorable to
United States exporters than would be a qualifier-legitimized territo-
rial tax system, then the qualifier effectively legitimizes DISC.50
This conclusion can be illustrated by a mathematical model.
Under this model, X is equal to the percentage of tax on foreign
source income deferred by DISC, and Y, a function of X, represents
the amount of increase in exports from the United States and the
extent of prejudice to the interests of other Contracting Parties,
caused by the United States' use of DISC. X' is equal to the percent-
age of tax on foreign source income deferred by a territorial system
of taxation, and Y', a function of X', represents the amount of
increase in exports from the United States and the extent of
prejudice to the interests of other Contracting Parties, caused by the
43. See supra note 21.
44. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 8.
45. Id
46. This figure is substantiated in 128 CONG. RIc. S7897 (daily ed. July 1, 1982).
47. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 5, 8.
48. Id at 3-5. See also infra note 60-63 and accompanying text.
49. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 5.
50. See id at 4-5.
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United States' use of a territorial system. According to Macdonald,
DISC defers tax on 17% of foreign source income.5' Thus, X is equal
to 17%. Under a territorial system of taxation, more than 17% of the
tax on foreign source income would be deferred.52 X' is therefore
greater than X.
Because the qualifier legitimizes the use of territorial systems of
taxation,53 an increase in United States exports and prejudice to the
interests of other Contracting Parties to the extent of Y' is within the
GATT-permissible limit of article XVI:1. Y', however, must be
greater than Y, because (1) Y' and Y are positive functions of X' and
X, respectively, and (2) X' is greater than X. Because the relevant
economic effects to the extent of Y' are within the GATT-legal
range, it follows that the same effects to the extent of Y are also
within the GATT-legal range. Hence, DISC is within the language
of article XVI: 1.
In addition, article XVI:1 states that if serious prejudice to the
interests of other Contracting Parties is found, the Contracting Party
granting-the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other Con-
tracting Parties "the possibility of limiting the subsidization." 54 It is
difficult to see, however, how a subsidization of Y could be limited
(ie., reduced) to an acceptable degree of subsidization of Y' when Y'
is greater than Y.
The above analysis shows that by preferring a tax system that
causes greater prejudice to the interests of other Contracting Parties
than does DISC, the qualifier implicitly legitimizes DISC. An alter-
native conclusion that can be drawn from the qualifier's reverse pref-
erence is that the qualifier is an inappropriate standard which does
not best promote GATT policy. The percentage of income deferred
under DISC or any tax deferral system is directly related to the
degree of economic benefit enjoyed by the country granting the
deferral and to the degree of injury suffered by other Contracting
Parties. Such economic benefit can manifest itself in terms of: an
increase in production; an increase in the volume of export sales; 55
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 47.
53. See supra notes 7 & 26 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 21.
55. In a statement before the Senate introducing his bill to supplant DISC (see infra
note 112 and accompanying text), Senator Boren provided the following statistical
analysis:
The positive impact of DISC upon U.S. exports has been significant.
Increased exports attributable to DISC grew from $1.9 billion in 1972 to almost
$7 billion in 1979. Since the enactment of DISC, U.S. nominal exports have
increased from $43 billion in 1971 to $220 billion in 1980. During this time,
export trade has become a larger component, of the gross national product,
growing from 4.4 percent in 1970 to 8.2 percent in 1980.
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positive secondary effects upon the volume of exports of complemen-
tary products; and stimulation of the economy, caused by increased
employment and by positive corporate behavior changes induced by
the tax incentives. When similar products are supplied by many
countries, the international market becomes a closed system in which
demand for products is especially responsive to price changes.5 6 In
these cases, an increase in the extent of tax deferral and hence of
economic benefit granted one Contracting Party necessarily
prejudices the interests of those other Contracting Parties that trade
in the same or similar products. Such prejudice results from injury
to the domestic market of the importing country and displacement of
the exports of like products from other Contracting Parties to the
importing country.57
The direct relationship between the amount of income tax a
nation allows its exporters to defer and the volume of exports from
that country establishes that unregulated tax deferral policies contra-
vene the article XVI:1 goal of controlling government-induced
increases in exports and avoiding the consequent prejudice to the
interests of other Contracting Parties.58 The qualifier's legitimiza-
tion of systems which permit the deferral or exemption of a greater
percentage of income than does DISC establishes that the qualifier
does not best serve the GATT policy goal of promoting reciprocal
trade on a mutually advantageous basis.59 The qualifier prefers tax
systems that, in comparison to DISC, cause greater prejudice to the
interests of Contracting Parties. Instead of conceding the validity of
the qualifier and attempting to defend DISC in light thereof, the
United States should attack the qualifier as an inappropriate stan-
dard which ignores a tax system's effect and therefore does not opti-
mally effect GATT policy objectives.
According to the Treasury Department, if DISC had been eliminated, exports
of non-manufactured products--mainly agricultural commodities, but not
including food and kindred products, leather, and tobacco products-would
have been reduced by $200 million to $400 million in 1979.
128 CONG. REc. S7895 (daily ed. July 1, 1982).
56. This result is exemplified by the agricultural sector, the principal user of DISC,
because identical agricultural products are supplied by many countries. Id
57. The Subsidies Code includes these factors in its list of adverse effects required to
demonstrate serious prejudice to the interests of other signatories. Agreement on Inter-
pretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, (Subsidies Code), GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W236, reprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 153,96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 259 (1979); and in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFF AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTs (26th Supp.) 56,
68 (1980).
58. See rupra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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2 Purpose of DISC: to Neutralize Erosion of United States
International Competitiveness
Macdonald advanced a second strong argument against the con-
demnation of DISC, based on the purposes embodied in DISC legis-
lation. He justified DISC by stating that its "primary purpose was to
alleviate the relative disadvantage that U.S. exporters operated
under as a result of the U.S. taxation of foreign source sales
income." 60
Macdonald discussed in detail the background that led to the
adoption of DISC. He explained how tax legislation prior to the
enactment of Subpart F legislation treated foreign branches of
United States corporations differently from foreign subsidiaries of
United States corporations, and how this difference necessitated
Subpart F legislation.61 Subpart F, however, by taxing currently the
foreign source sales income to the United States shareholders and
thus eliminating the tax deferral, placed the United States exporters
at a competitive disadvantage, relative to foreign exporters operating
under a territorial system.62 As Macdonald explained:
The dramatic deterioration in the U.S. international balance of trade
during the late 1960s created the incentive to correct the global taxation of
foreign source income subsequent to 1962 by bringing U.S. tax treatment of
foreign source sales income into approximate congruence with the tax treat-
ment available under an exemption tax system. Thus, DISC was enacted in
1971.63
60. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 4.
61. Under the pre-Subpart F tax system, foreign source income earned by a foreign
branch of a United States corporation was regarded as income of the United States cor-
poration and was taxed on a current basis, regardless of when repatriated from the for-
eign branch. The problem of international double taxation was alleviated by allowing
the United States corporation a credit against its United States tax equal to the amount of
tax imposed by the country in which the branch was located. In contrast, foreign source
income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a United States corporation was not regarded
as income of the corporation; the Internal Revenue Service recognized the separate entity
status of the subsidiary. The foreign sales income was deferred until repatriated. Upon
repatriation, a foreign tax credit was allowed to offset both the foreign taxes paid by the
subsidiary on the earnings from which the dividend was paid and the foreign taxes paid
by the dividend recipient.
This pre-Subpart F system treatment of foreign subsidiary income was similar to that
under a territorial system, in that the income was not subject to United States taxation
unless and until repatriated. Such treatment encouraged United States corporations with
foreign sales to form "dummy" foreign subsidiaries through which they could channel
products produced and sold for use outside the country in which the foreign subsidiary
was located. Under this system, the United States corporation could enjoy the low tax
rate of the foreign jurisdiction as long as the foreign sales income was not repatriated.
To close this "loophole," Congress enacted Subpart F legislation (I.R.C. §§ 952-964);
Subpart F eliminated the deferral granted to foreign subsidiaries and treated them in a
manner similar to foreign branches of a United States corporation. Macdonald State-




A tax system designed to neutralize the competitive advantages
enjoyed by other nations promotes GATT objectives by attempting
to create or restore reciprocity of advantage and by eliminating dis-
criminatory treatment in international trade.64 Nevertheless, strict
application of the qualifier results in condemnation of such a sys-
tem.65 Accordingly, the United States should attack the qualifier as
a standard which does not adequately effect GATT policy goals.
An extension of Macdonald's second DISC defense provides the
additional argument that the qualifier is a structural limitation which
ignores important functional considerations. Macdonald stated to
the GATT Council that "[t]he objective of [DISC] legislation was to
allow U.S. corporations to structure foreign sales activities in a com-
parable manner to that which existed prior to enactment of Subpart
F in 1962. The dfference was one ofform, rather than substance. ' 66
Because the difference between DISC and pre-Subpart F taxa-
tion was one of form only, it follows that if the pre-Subpart F tax
system was GATT-legal, DISC must also be GATT-legal. 67 The
GATT-legality of the pre-Subpart F tax system can be established in
the following manner. First, the Contracting Parties must have rec-
ognized in 1946 that the United States would not have entered into
an agreement that would have made its existing system of taxation a
violation of the treaty.68 Second, the pre-Subpart F method of taxa-
tion is GATT-legal under the qualifier. The pre-1962 system taxed
income earned by a foreign branch of a United States corporation on
a current basis. It only deferred tax on income earned by a foreign
subsidiary of a United States corporation.69 This treatment is within
the language of the first prong of the qualifier, which allows exemp-
tion of economic processes located outside the territorial limits of the
exporting country.70 Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the Con-
tracting Parties have never issued any complaints concerning the
GATT-legality of the pre-Subpart F system of taxation. Because
64. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
66. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 4 (emphasis added).
67. See id at 3-4.
68. Long before the GATT existed, the territoriality principle... was a part of
the tax structure of most of the nations that became the Contracting Parties.
When Article XVI(4) was drafted and approved, none of the signatory govern-
ments indicated the slightest intention of disturbing these tax structures. GATT
obligations are contractual, and the words of a contractual obligation should
never be read to arrive at results so clearly at odds with the parties' intentions.
Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round.- An Unfinished Business, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 165 n.61 (1980). Similarly, it can be argued that the pre-Sub-
part F system was "grand-fathered" by the General Agreement.
69. See supra note 61.
70. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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pre-Subpart F legislation is GATT-legal in light of the qualifier, and
DISC, which differs from such legislation in form only, is not
GATT-legal, the qualifier itself appears to be a semantic limitation
of form, not substance.
3. United States Source of Income Rules
Macdonald's third argument against DISC condemnation com-
pared the amount of taxable income deferred under DISC to the
foreign source portion of taxable income from export sales, deter-
mined under United States source of income rules.7' Section 863(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code72 provides that income from the sale
of property produced in the United States and sold in a foreign
country must be allocated to or apportioned between the United
States and the foreign country.73 Thus, an application of section
863(b) results in exemption from taxation of the foreign source por-
tion of export sales income. Because the qualifier permits exporting
countries to exempt from taxation economic processes that occur
outside the territory of the country, section 863(b) is consistent with
the qualifier's interpretation of article XVI:4.74
By employing an effects test, Macdonald attempted to establish
that DISC is more favorable to the trading partners of the United
States than section 863(b), which the qualifier legitimizes.75  "In
most cases, the foreign source portion of the taxable income from an
export sale, determined under the section 863(b) rules, would equal
or exceed the portion of the combined taxable income of a parent
corporation and its DISC on an export sale which would be subject
to a deferral of tax under the present DISC rules."'76 Thus, the quali-
fier legitimizes section 863(b) and condemns DISC, even though sec-
71. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 6-8.
72. I.R.C. § 863(b) (1976). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.863-2 (1983).
73. Where a factory or production price to wholly independent distributors or
other concerns may be established, the taxable income attributable to the United
States is computed by reference to such independent factory price. Where an
independent factory price may not be established, the taxable income from such
sales is first determined by deducting from the gross income from the sale the
expenses, losses, or other deductions properly allocated and apportioned to such
income. One-half of the taxable income is then apportioned between the United
States and the foreign country in accordance with the value of the taxpayer's
property subject to the section 863(b) allocation in the United States and in the
foreign country. The other one-half of the taxable income is apportioned
between the United States and the foreign country in accordance with the tax-
payer's gross sales subject to section 863(b) allocation within the United States
and such gross sales in the foreign country.
Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 7.
74. Id at 6-8.
75. Id at 7-8.
76. Id
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tion 863(b) causes greater prejudice to the interests of other
Contracting Parties. In this respect, the qualifier does not best serve
GATT's policy of guarding against such prejudice.77 By emphasiz-
ing the technical question whether the economic activity is within or
without the territorial limits of the exporting country, and excluding
any consideration of the effect of the tax system, the qualifier pro-
duces results which are unrelated to the important policy issues
underlying GATT-legality determinations.
4. Global v. Territorial Systems of Taxation
Macdonald reminded the GATT Council that the 1976 Panel
Report compared the effect of DISC to that of a global system of
taxation and that the qualifier shifted the focus of legitimacy from
global to territorial systems. Accordingly, he argued, the effect of
DISC can be determined only in comparison to territorial systems of
taxation. 78 He then reminded the GATT Council of the previously
uncontested United States statement that the United States collects
more taxes under DISC than it would collect under a GATT-legal
territorial system.79
As previously demonstrated, a system's level of taxation
inversely affects article XVI:1 considerations such as the degree of
prejudice to the interests of other Contracting Parties and the
increase in exports from or the decrease in imports into the exporting
country.8 0 Thus, the uncontested United States statement suggests
that DISC better serves the intent of article XVI: 1 than does a quali-
fier-sanctioned territorial system.
Extending this fourth argument to its extreme illustrates the
inappropriateness of the qualifier. Assume that the United States
enacted a strictly territorial tax system which exempted from United
States taxation 100% of the income from export activities located
outside the territory of the United States. As long as such a system
required arm's-length pricing, the system would be a GATT-legal
method of avoiding double taxation of foreign income.8' In contrast,
assume that Congress amended DISC legislation to reduce the tax
benefits from the present effective level of 17% deferral of tax to an
effective deferral of only 1%. Because of the qualifier's territorial
focus, this amended DISC legislation would still violate GATT. In
terms of the intent of article XVI:I, however, the GATT-legal total
77. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
78. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 8.
79. Id
80. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
81. Such a system would be impractical, however, because of the great strain it
would impose upon the Treasury, in terms of lost tax revenue.
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exemption system would prejudice the interests of other Contracting
Parties more than would the greatly weakened GATT-illegal DISC
system.82
Rather than condemn a system that would cause greater injury
to the interests of other Contracting Parties, the qualifier condemns
the alternative system that would better promote the goals of article
XVI: 1. By focusing upon structural rather than functional consider-
ations, the qualifier cannot optimally further the functional objec-
tives of the General Agreement.
5. The Best Defense is a Good Offense
Macdonald concluded his defense of DISC by attacking the tax
systems of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 83 After stating
that "[w]hat is sauce for the goose, must be sauce for the gander,"' 4
Macdonald condemned France and the Netherlands for employing a
global system for losses and a territorial system for profits.8 5 By
employing a global system for losses, France and the Netherlands
allow taxpayers to take advantage of increased loss deductions to
offset domestic profits. 86 Thus, although one of the aims of the Gen-
eral Agreement is to achieve "mutually advantageous arrange-
ments, ' 87 the qualifier legitimizes the tax systems of two nations
whose loss treatment increases the degree of competitive advantage
they already enjoy.
If the qualifier examined the effect of tax systems instead of sim-
ply adhering to structural guidelines, its scope would not be deficient
with respect to the tax treatment of losses. Rather, the qualifier
would automatically factor into consideration any relevant feature of
a tax system. The qualifier presently is deficient in scope, however,
and thus is ineffective in protecting the Contracting Parties from the
prejudice of harmful subsidies.
Macdonald concluded by attacking Belgium for providing safe
haven levels of taxation on exports, similar to those provided by
DISC.88 The GATT Council's refusal to consider the validity of
Macdonald's attack upon Belgium suggests that the qualifier's dis-
tinction between GATT-legal and GATT-illegal tax systems is
purely semantic. Although the Belgian and United States tax sys-
82. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
83. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 9.
84. Id at 8.
85. Id at 9.
86. Because world-wide profits are not subject to tax under a territorial system, the
increased loss deductions arising from recognition of world-wide losses are deducted
against domestic profits. See supra note 7.
87. See supra text accompanying note 42.
88. Macdonald Statement, supra note 8, at 9.
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tems are demonstrably similar, the Belgian system is GATT-legal
because it is a territorial system and is therefore squarely within the
language of the qualifier. Conversely, the United States system is
GATT-illegal because it is not within the language of the qualifier.
By applying a standard that looks only to the form of a tax system
and not to its substance, the GATT Council relies too heavily upon
the semantics of its rigid guidelines, at the expense of GATT policy.
6. A Proposed Sixth Defense
In each case in which Macdonald advanced an otherwise meri-
torious defense of DISC, the qualifier nullified the defense. The
qualifier, in focusing upon structural rather than functional consid-
erations, produces results that ignore GATT policy objectives. The
United States should defend DISC on the ground that the GATT
Council's qualifier is invalid.
Further, the United States should propose a modification to the
qualifier so that it would better serve GATT policy. While retaining
the requirement of arm's-length pricing and acceptance of measures
designed to avoid double taxation of foreign source income, the
modified qualifier should discard the structural distinction between
economic processes located within and without the territory of an
exporting country. Instead, the modified qualifier should include a
level of taxation test which would monitor the effect of the tax sys-
tem upon the economic interests of other Contracting Parties. Such
a modification would produce results that would better promote
GATT policy goals. Until the United States contests the validity of
the present qualifier, the qualifier will continue to condemn DISC.
III
ALTERNATIVES TO DISC
A literal application of the qualifier does not relieve DISC of
the 1976 Panel Report's finding of GATT violations.8 9 This result,
combined with increased pressure from the EC,90 apparently forced
the United States to concede; in the fall of 1982, President Reagan
made a commitment before the GATT Council to propose legisla-
tion that would address the concerns regarding the GATT-legality of
DISC.91 Accordingly, a number of tax systems have been proposed
to replace it.
89. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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In analyzing the proposed DISC alternatives, 92 several features
should be considered. Most importantly, if the Contracting Parties
continue to adhere to the qualifier, the replacement of DISC must
meet the qualifier's requirements.93 The new tax system also should
provide United States exporters with benefits similar to those they
enjoy under DISC, so as to continue to neutralize, in the aggregate,
the competitive advantage enjoyed by other nations. Finally, the
new tax system should not decrease the amount of revenue collected
by the United States Treasury. The ideal DISC replacement would
thus satisfy the qualifier and would be benefit- and revenue-neutral.
A. INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION
. Description
On December 11, 1981, Representatives Bill Frenzel and Sam
Gibbons introduced the International Sales Corporation (ISC) Tax
Act of 1981. 94 An ISC is defined as a foreign corporation that would
operate as a subsidiary through which the export activity of its
United States parent could be channeled.95 The income of an ISC
would be subject to taxation by the foreign jurisdiction in which the
ISC was located96 and no foreign tax credit would be allowed.97
Dividends actually received by an ISC's United States shareholders
would be fully deductible. 98
ISC rules governing intercompany pricing99 and qualification
for ISC treatment'00 would be similar to their DISC counterparts.
92. The proposals are presented in chronological order. Although some of the early
proposals may no longer be under serious consideration, they are included for historical
perspective and comparative purposes.
93. For the purpose of this Note, it is assumed that the qualifier adopted by the
GATT Council, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text, and not the modified
qualifier suggested herein, is the standard by which the Contracting Parties will evaluate
proposed DISC alternatives. Accordingly, this Note analyzes such alternatives in light of
the GATT Council's qualifier. In discussing the revenue effect of the alternatives, how-
ever, this Note indirectly performs a modified qualifier analysis. The revenue effect of a
tax system is related to its effect upon the economic interests of other Contracting Parties.
If, for example, a system is not revenue neutral because it results in a significant loss to
the United States Treasury, such loss signifies a corresponding gain (in the form of tax
benefits) to United States exporters. These tax benefits strengthen the international com-
petitiveness of the United States exporters, at the expense of other Contracting Parties.
Thus, an examination of a tax proposal's revenue effect implicitly includes an analysis of
the effect of the proposal upon the economic interests of other Contracting Parties. Con-
sideration of such effect is the essence of the modified qualifier.
94. H.R. 5179, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
95. The bill defines a foreign corporation as a corporation that is not incorporated
under the laws of any State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id § 2(a), at 2.
96. Id § 2(a), at 3.
97. Id § 2(c), at 14-15.
98. Id § 2(b), at 13-14.
99. Id § 2(b), at 12-13.
100. Id § 2(a), at 2-7.
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An ISC would not be allowed to have more than one class of stock
or more than four related shareholders.' 01
Unlike its successor, the ESC proposal, 02 ISC would require
the repeal of DISC,1 03 thereby precluding a corporation from operat-
ing both a DISC and an ISC. If a DISC shareholder transferred
qualified export assets of the DISC to an ISC, no gain or loss would
be recognized by the shareholder, the DISC, or the ISC.1°4 Any
accumulated DISC earnings and profits transferred to an ISC would
increase the earnings and profits of the ISC, and would be consid-
ered qualified export receipts for the purpose of ISC qualification
requirements. 105
2. Analysis
The proposed ISC legislation only partially satisfies the quali-
fier. Because an ISC would be a foreign corporation located outside
the territorial limits of the United States, its "economic processes
• ..need not be subject to taxation by the [United States]. .... ,.06
Therefore, the ISC proposal's purpose and method of avoiding
double taxation of foreign source income are permissible under the
qualifier.10 7 ISC's intercompany pricing rules, however, are identical
to those of DISC, which violate the qualifier's requirement that
transactions between an exporter and its related foreign buyer be at
arm's-length. 08 Accordingly, to be GATT-legal, the ISC proposal
would have to be revised to require arm's-length intercompany
pricing.
Although ISC could be amended to conform to the qualifier, its
increased revenue cost threatens its viability as an alternative to
DISC. 10 9 Because ISC shareholders would be allowed a 100%
deduction for dividends actually received, 10 the proposal is not rev-
enue-neutral. The United States would lose a share of the revenue
that it would otherwise receive under DISC. In addition, the limit
101. Id §2(a), at 3.
102. See infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
103. H.R. 5179, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(d), at 15 (1981).
104. Id § 4, at 16-17.
105. Id
106. See supra note 24.
107. Id
108. See supra notes 24, 33-35 & 99 and accompanying text.
109. Macdonald stated that switching to a truly territorial system, like that of Euro-
pean and many other countries, "would be great for our exporters, but unfortunately, it
would cost Treasury, it has been estimated, a couple of billion dollars at least." USTR
Suggests Plan to Change DISC to Make It More Compatible with the GA7T, U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 418, 622, 623 (Aug. 3, 1982).
110. See text accompanying note 98.
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upon the number of related shareholders permitted to own an ISC Il l
would unnecessarily discourage small exporters from enjoying ISC
benefits. Thus, in light of its nonconformity with the qualifier and,
more importantly, its heavy revenue cost, ISC legislation does not
appear to be a feasible alternative to DISC. Its strict territoriality
would impose too great a burden upon the United States Treasury.
B. EXPORT SALES CORPORATION
L Description
On July 1, 1982, Senate Finance Committee member David L.
Boren introduced the Export Sales Corporation (ESC) Act of
1982.112 An ESC is defined as a foreign corporation that would func-
tion as a subsidiary through which the parent United States exporter
could perform export activities." 3 The income of an ESC would be
subject to taxation by the foreign jurisdiction and not by the United
States." 4 The United States shareholders of the ESC, however,
would be deemed to have received annually 100% of the taxable
income of the ESC as taxable dividends."15 The dividends received
deduction 1 6 would be limited to the percentage required to hold
constant the revenue cost to the United States Treasury.' '7 No credit
or deduction would be allowed for foreign taxes paid or deemed
paid by an ESC or by an ESC shareholder for dividends paid by the
111. See text accompanying note 101.
112. 128 CONG. Rac. S7895 (daily ed. July 1, 1982). A section-by-section analysis of
the bill is reprinted at 128 CONG. Rnc. S7897-98 (daily ed. July 1, 1982).
113. Section-by-Section Analysis of S.2708, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
S7897, at §§ 2.1, 2.2 (daily ed. July 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Section-by-Section Anal-
ysis of S.2708]. An ESC may be established in any United States possession, other than
Puerto Rico, which is within the customs territory of the United States. Id § 2.1.
114. Id §§ 2.1, 2.3.
115. Id. § 2.3.
116. Under the general rule, dividends received by a corporation are fully deductible
if the recipient is a member of the same affiliated group as the distributor or if the recipi-
ent is a small business investment company. In all other cases, the deduction is limited to
85%. See I.R.C. § 243 (1976) (specifying deductibility of dividends received by
corporations).
117. The dividends received deduction percentages would be derived from Treasury
Department data, as follows:
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ESC.t18
To qualify as an ESC, a corporation would have to limit its
activities to the export of American products and related services.' 19
The corporation also would have to meet a gross assets and gross
receipts test almost identical to that imposed upon DISCs.
120
Intercompany pricing rules similar to those contained in DISC legis-
lation would govern transactions between an ESC and its parent.
21
Unlike DISC, the ESC Act would allow smaller exporters to
take advantage of the favorable tax treatment. 22 The ESC proposal
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations
permitting multiple ownership of ESCs by unrelated shareholders.1
23
Shareholders who previously could not establish DISCs by them-
selves would thus be able to combine resources to establish ESCs.
Benefits would accrue to each shareholder in proportion to the vol-




ESC proposal with 30
percent div. rec.
deduction ............
Additional rev. cost .....
Percentage required to hold




ESC proposal with 30
percent div. rec.
deduction ...........
Additional rev. cost .....
Percentage required to hold
rev. cost constant .......
$1,770 $1,830 $1,890 $1,960
$1,650 $1,777 $1,920 $1,073
($120) ($53) $ 30 $ 113
32.17 30.89 29.54 28.36
$1,730 $1,810 $1,870 $1,930
$1,613 $1,758 $1,899 $2,041
($117) ($52) $ 29 $ 111
32.17 30.89 29.54 28.36
128 CONG. REc. S7897 (daily ed. July 1, 1982) (introductory remarks of Sen. Boren).
118. Section-by-Section Analysis of S. 2708, supra note 113, at § 2.4.
119. Id § 2.2.
120. Id.
121. Id § 2.6.
122. Rep. Henry Nowak (D., N.Y.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Tax, Access to
Equity Capital and Business Opportunities (of the House Small Business Committee),
stated that increasing export opportunities for smaller firms would expand the economic
base nationally and in particular would help older urban centers. The Subcommittee
estimated that there are approximately 20,000 small companies that, given the proper tax
incentive, could begin exporting profitably. Schwartz, Proposal to Replace DISC Gains
Stature, AMERICAN METAL MARKET, Oct. 26, 1982, at 18.
123. Section-by-Section Analysis of S. 2708, supra note 113, at § 4.
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ume of exports channeled through the ESC. 24
DISC shareholders desiring to change their DISCs to ESCs
could transfer the assets and earnings of the DISC to an ESC in a
tax-free exchange. 2 5 A corporation would not be allowed, however,
to have both a DISC and an ESC as subsidiaries.12 6
2. Analysis
In his presentation to the Senate, Senator Boren stated:
The GATT-legality problem [of DISC taxation] would be solved by provid-
ing for the establishment of ESC's in a U.S. territory or foreign country that
imposes taxes. The ESC would then stand in the same shoes as similar com-
panies utilized by Japanese, Dutch, French, and English exporters. While
the DISC is viewed by some as an illegal trade subsidy, the ESC, under
GATT precedents, would be a permissible means of avoiding double taxa-
tion of foreign income.
127
Boren's assertion that his territorial proposal is GATT-legal
under GATT precedents is only partially correct. Because an ESC
would be located outside the territorial limits of the United States,
the qualifier would permit the United States to exempt from taxation
the economic processes of an ESC without violating article XVI:4.128
In addition, the ESC proposal's purpose of avoiding double taxation
of foreign source income is permissible under the qualifier. 129 By
departing from the qualifier's requirement that pricing
between a parent and its foreign subsidiary be at arm's-length, 30 the
proposed ESC legislation violates the qualifier. ESC intercompany
pricing rules, in part, are identical to those of DISC, which violate
the qualifier's arm's-length requirement.' 3' Thus, in order to estab-
lish a system that would accord with the qualifier, Boren should
revise the proposed ESC Act to require arm's-length pricing.
In addition to the change necessary to satisfy the qualifier, the
ESC proposal should be amended to ensure that the taxation of
ESCs would be benefit- and revenue-neutral. Under DISC, an
exporter's tax benefit is related to the amount of DISC income it
124. 128 CONG. REc. S7895 (daily ed. July 1, 1982) (introductory remarks of Sen.
Boren).
125. Section-by-Section Analysis of S. 2708, supra note 113, at S7897-98, at § 5.
126. Id at S7897, at § 2.5. According to Senator Boren, most exporters will want to
use the new ESC provisions. As a result, the legality of DISC under GATT will become
moot. See 128 CONG. REc. 57897 (daily ed. July 1, 1982) (introductory remarks of Sen.
Boren).
127. 128 CONG. REc. S7897 (daily ed. July 1, 1982) (introductory remarks of Sen.
Boren).
128. See supra note 24.
129. Id
130. Id
131. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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generates, and is unaffected by the activity of its competitors. 3 2 In
contrast, the ESC Act would establish in advance the total amount of
allowable relief. The appropriate dividends received deduction per-
centage would then be calculated as that percentage which, when
applied to all ESC income, would grant the aggregate amount of
predetermined allowable relief and thus would hold the revenue cost
constant. 33 If the number of exporters electing ESC status
increased, the benefit accruing to each ESC would necessarily
decrease, in order to hold constant the aggregate revenue cost. In
addition, the probability that the ESC Act would attract small
exporters, for whom DISC qualifications are too burdensome, 34
threatens to decrease further the benefits available to taxpayers
under ESC taxation. Hence, the derivative calculation of ESC relief
is unlikely to result in benefit-neutrality.
ESC's derivation of the dividends received deduction percent-
age from estimates of DISC revenue additionally jeopardizes the
proposal's benefit- and revenue-neutrality. If, for example, the
Treasury Department's estimates of DISC revenue cost are high, the
ESC Act would apply an erroneously large dividends received
deduction percentage to ESC income, thereby destroying ESC's rev-
enue-neutrality. Similarly, if estimates are low, the system would
not be benefit-neutral; an erroneously small dividends received
deduction would cause each ESC to owe more tax than it would
otherwise owe under DISC.
To avoid these problems, the ESC system's backward-looking
aggregate dividends received deduction percentage adjustment
should be replaced by a forward-looking individual determination.
Instead of applying the derived dividends received deduction per-
centage "across the board," the legislation should provide that the
appropriate percentage be determined on an individual basis. Each
ESC should be required to limit its dividends received deduction to
the percentage that would result in its owing the same amount of tax
that it would owe under DISC.135 This percentage would be derived
from actual, not estimated, data.
Under ESC, as modified above, the system would be GATT-
132. The DISC system does not predetermine the amount of tax relief available. See
supra note 1.
133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
135. Such a percentage could be provided by the Internal Revenue Service, using a
pre-calculated tax table, reading: "If your taxable ESC income is column A, then your
dividends received deduction is limited to the percentage in column B." The table of
percentages could be calculated in the same manner as that which derived the standard
ESC percentages, see supra note 117, but actual individual data, as opposed to estimated
aggregate data, would be used.
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legal, revenue-neutral, 36 and benefit-neutral. Moreover, unlike
DISC, the ESC proposal would not require companies to reinvest
the income on which the tax benefit is granted. 37 In this respect,
ESC benefits would be more attractive than DISC benefits, because
their use would be unrestricted.
C. MACDONALD PROPOSAL
1. Description
On July 27, 1982, Deputy United States Trade Representative
Macdonald proposed a revenue-neutral, quasi-territorial system as
an alternative to DISC. 38 Under his proposal, United States compa-
nies with DISCs would pay the taxes that are currently deferred
under DISC.' 39 The companies would then receive a credit against
foreign source income equal to the amount that previously would
have been deferred under DISC. 140 "In this way, the tax benefit of
the DISC would be eliminated and replaced with an equivalent tax
benefit related to income from economic processes located outside
the territorial limits of the United States."' 41 The DISC would con-
tinue to operate, for accounting purposes, in order to identify the
amount of the tax credit that the companies would receive against
the foreign income.142
2. Analysis
Macdonald's proposal arguably violates the qualifier. The first
prong of the qualifier assesses a tax system's GATT-legality by refer-
ence to the source of the income upon which tax relief is granted, not
the method of granting relief.'43 Although Macdonald's proposed
system would grant tax relief through the use of a foreign source
136. The individual determination of the benefit-neutral dividends received deduction
percentage would ensure an individually revenue-neutral system. A system that is reve-
nue-neutral on an individual basis must also be neutral in the aggregate. (The converse,
however, is not always true.)
137. Under DISC, the deferral of tax operates as an interest-free loan. The accumu-
lated DISC income upon which the deferral is granted must be reinvested, however,
usually either in qualified export assets or in the form of producer's loans. I.R.C.
§§ 993(b)(5), 993(d) (1980).
138. USTR Suggests Plan to Change DISC to Make It More Compatible with the
GA477, U.S. ExPoRT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 418, at 622-23 (Aug. 3, 1982). Macdonald
emphasized that his proposal belongs only to the Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, and is not an official policy of the Reagan Administration.
139. Id at 622.
140. Id at 622-23.
141. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of Ambassador Mac-
donald's July 27 News Briefing on DISC 2 (July 29, 1982) (on file at the offices of the
CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL).
142. Id
143. See supra note 24.
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income tax credit, as opposed to a DISC tax deferral, the income
source would still be economic processes arising from a DISC.144 As
a DISC's domestic incorporation precludes DISC legislation from
falling within the qualifier's exemption of economic processes which
occur outside the territory of the exporting country, 145 the failure of
the Macdonald proposal to require incorporation outside the United
States similarly causes the proposal to violate the first prong of the
qualifier. In addition, by using DISC rules to determine the amount
of tax benefit, Macdonald's proposal retains DISC's non-arm's-
length pricing feature.!46 The proposal thus violates the second
prong as well.
Macdonald's proposal is, however, revenue- and benefit-neu-
tral. Unlike the ISC and ESC proposals, Macdonald's proposal
would exempt from taxation the amount of tax that DISC presently
defers. In addition, like the ESC proposal,147 Macdonald's proposed
system does not require companies to reinvest the income on which
the tax benefit is provided, thus allowing each company to use that
income in its most efficient manner.1 48
D. FOREIGN TRADING COMPANY INCOME
1. Description
On March 2, 1983, the Cabinet Council on Commerce and
Trade (CCCT) approved the Foreign Trading Company Income
(FTI) proposal submitted to it by the Treasury Department, the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 149 The proposal would require a United States
exporter to perform export activity through its offshore entity, which
must be a foreign corporation. 150 To qualify for the exemption from
144. See supra notes 139-40 & 142 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. Administration Unveils Tax Alternative to Domestic International Sales Corpora-
tion (DISC), [1983] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP.(CCH) 6157, at 70,868 (Mar. 16, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Administration's Proposal].
150. The foreign export sales corporation must be incorporated outside U.S. terri-
tory. This requirement reflects the GATT rule that countries need not tax export
income from economic processes occurring outside their territorial limits....
For the purposes of this proposal, the U.S. territories of Guam, the Virgin
Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands will be considered outside the terri-
tory of the United States. This definition conforms to the definition of territory
as customs territory used in the GATT. Additionally, the foreign sales corpora-
tion can only be located in a territory or country which has an exchange of infor-
mation agreement with the United States.
Id §§ I, V, at 70,869-70,870.
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taxation on a portion of its income from export sales (its FTI),15 the
foreign corporation would be required to: (1) maintain an office
outside the United States, (2) maintain its books and records in the
foreign office, (3) have at least one resident director in the foreign
office, (4) have an agency agreement or distribution license with
respect to the exported product, and (5) solicit and process orders,
negotiate contracts, bill customers, and receive payment outside the
United States. 152  These foreign presence requirements were
designed to satisfy the first prong of the qualifier which allows
exemption from taxation of income from economic processes located
outside the territory of the exporting country.' 53
A qualifying foreign corporation would not be subject to United
151. FTI is defined as income (including both profits and commissions) derived in
connection with foreign trading gross receipts. Foreign trading gross receipts are
gross receipts from:
a. the sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property;
b. the lease or rental of export property which is used by the lessee outside
the United States;
c. the performance of services which are related and subsidiary to the sale,
exchange, lease, rental, or other disposition of export property by the foreign
corporation;
d. the performance of engineering or architectural services for construction
projects located outside the United States; and
e. the performance of managerial services in furtherance of the production of
foreign export trading gross receipts.
"Export property" generally means property manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted in the United States for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside
the United States.
Id § II, at 70,869.
152. Id § IV. In response to adverse business reactions, the Administration made the
fifth requirement more flexible. The proposal states that some or all of the functions
listed in requirement (5) may be performed by the foreign corporation or for it on a
contract basis. "If... U.S. exporters as part of their normal business practice perform
other significant activities outside the United States, consideration will be given to substi-
tuting those for some or all of the functions listed in [item (5)]." Id These "other signifi-
cant activities" include:
a. disbursement of export related advertising expenses;
b. maintenance of separate bank account;
c. maintenance of paid in capital;
d. holding directors' meetings;
e. holding shareholders' meetings;
f. disbursement of dividends;
g. disbursement of legal fees;
h. disbursement of accounting fees;
i. disbursement of officers' salaries;
j. disbursement of directors' salaries;
k. communicating with the general public; and
1. transfer of title.
Id
153. Id § IV, at 70,869-70,870. "It should be noted, however, that these foreign pres-
ence requirements do not prevent a foreign corporation from maintaining an office in the
United States, or from concluding contracts to have activities performed on its behalf in
the United States." Id
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States taxation on a portion of its FTI. 54 The tax exempt portion of
FTI would be determined under arm's-length transfer pricing princi-
ples. 155 Income from export sales would be allocated between the
foreign corporation and the related United States company on the
basis of an allocation rule designed for administrative convenience
to approximate arm's-length pricing.156 This administrative alloca-
tion would be equal to the greater of: (a) 17% of the combined taxa-
ble income earned by the United States manufacturer and foreign
sales corporation; or (b) 1.35% of the foreign corporation's gross
sales, not to exceed 34% of the combined taxable income.1 57 As an
alternative, taxpayers could determine the allocation of income
under the current Internal Revenue Code arm's-length transfer price
rules.1 58 Regardless of the allocation method elected by the tax-
payer, the tax exempt portion of FTI would not be included in the
income of a United States shareholder for the purpose of Subpart F
taxation.1 59 The United States shareholder would be allowed a 100%
dividends received deduction for dividends actually received from
the tax exempt FTI.' 60
The FTI proposal would accomodate small exporters, for whom
the offshore presence requirements might be too burdensome. Small
businesses would be given the option of either continuing to operate
their DISCs and paying an interest charge on the value of their tax
deferral, 61 or participating in jointly-owned foreign sales
corporations. 162
154. Id § IV, at 70,869.
155. Id § III.
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id See supra note 34.
159. Administration's Proposal, supra note 149, at § VI, at 70,870. For a discussion of
Subpart F, see supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
160. Administration's Proposal, supra note 149, at § VI, at 70,870. "The dividends
received deduction will be in lieu of a foreign tax credit. Other earnings will remain
subject to the existing U.S. tax regime, including the subpart F and foreign tax credit
rules." Id For a discussion of the dividends received deduction, see supra note 116.
161. Adminstration's Proposal, supra note 149, at § IXa.
Under this alternative, exporters would be allowed to continue to operate their
DISC's for sales of up to $10 million. An annual deductible interest charge
would be imposed on the value of the tax deferral at the Treasury bill rate. The
current pricing rules would remain in effect, but the deemed distribution and
incremental provisions would be eliminated. Thus, up to 100 percent of the
DISC income covered by this alternative could be deferred. This would be nec-
essary to make the approach attractive in light of the additional cost associated
with the interest charge.
Id
162. Id § IXb.
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2 Anasis
The Treasury Department proposal satisfies the qualifier. The
foreign incorporation and substantial foreign presence requirements
that a company would have to meet to qualify for FTI treatment
satisfy the qualifier's first requirement that tax exempt income be
from economic processes located outside the United States. 63 A
company's allocation of income on the basis of either the safe harbor
approximations of an arm's-length transfer price or a transfer price
determined under section 482 rules complies with the qualifier's sec-
ond requirement that an exporter treat its related foreign buyers at
arm's-length.164 Finally, the system's objective of avoiding double
taxation is explicitly permitted by the qualifier. 165
The revenue-neutrality of the FTI proposal is ensured by a
combination of the income allocation rules and section VII of the
proposal, entitled "Revenue Neutral Cap on the Tax Exempt Bene-
fit."'1 66 "The CCCT specified that the proposed alternative should
cost no more than the DISC in terms of lost tax revenue."' 67 The
proposal establishes a tax benefit ceiling of: (1) 34% of the combined
taxable income of the foreign corporation and its related supplier, if
the taxpayer uses the safe harbor allocation rule; or (2) 34% of the
foreign corporation's FTI, if the taxpayer determines its transfer
prices under section 482 or purchases its goods from unrelated
parties. 6
Because the cost to the Treasury is directly related to the benefit
to all exporters, a system that is revenue-neutral must be benefit-
neutral, in the aggregate. Individual benefit-neutrality, however,
depends upon an exporter's profit expectation and current cash flow
position. For example, an exporter in need of funds in year one, but
not expecting substantial profits until years two through ten, might
prefer in year one a higher DISC tax deferral to a lower FTI tax
exemption. In most cases, however, the FTI system would provide
United States exporters with the same basic tax benefits they receive
under DISC.169 In addition, in contrast to DISC benefits, the FTI
exemption would provide a source of immediately available funds to
163. See supra note 24.
164. Id
165. Id
166. Administration's Proposal, supra note 149, at § VII, at 70,870.
167. Id.
168. Id
169. Lawrence, Tax Programfor Exports To Replace DISC Outlined, The Journal of




A major disadvantage of the FTI proposal, however, is that the
foreign presence requirements that a company would have to satisfy
to qualify for FTI treatment would place substantial burdens upon
such qualifying companies. Some members of the business commu-
nity believe that the offshore sales activity requirements would
demand "a heavy commitment of a company's sales force and could
have the effect of 'exporting jobs.' "171
As foreign incorporation alone arguably satisfies the first prong
of the qualifier, 172 FTI's substantial foreign presence requirements
are unnecessary to ensure that the proposal will not violate GATT.
Maintenance of books and records in a foreign office staffed by one
resident director173 is a requirement which is unrelated to the impor-
tant issues that underlie the acceptability of export tax incentives in
the international community. The Contracting Parties would proba-
bly place greater emphasis upon the volume of goods exported than
upon the location and contents of the exporter's office. Likewise, the
requirement that the foreign corporation have an agency agreement
or distribution license with respect to the exported product'74 is a
paper requirement which is unrelated to the goal of protecting the
interests of the Contracting Parties. The first four foreign presence
requirements are mere "window dressing" which elevate form over
substance.
The fifth requirement that a company conduct certain of its
business activities outside the United States is also unnecessary. The
requirement can be satisfied if the activities are performed not by the
foreign corporation, butfor it on a contract basis.17 5 Accordingly,
this requirement, as are the first four foreign presence requirements,
is a technicality which is unrelated to the policy concerns of the Con-
tracting Parties. Indeed, the Treasury Department itself is unsure of
the necessity under GATT of this required activity.1
76
Analogous to the United States "minimum contacts" jurisdic-
tional requirement, 177 the foreign presence requirements of the pro-
170. The proposal eliminates conditions of the tax benefit such as the requirement
under DISC that tax deferred income be invested in certain assets. See supra note 137.
171. See Treasury Weighs Increasing Its Offshore Requirementfor Firms in DISC Sub-
situte, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 20, at 786 (Feb. 22, 1983). Another critic
responded to the proposal, "If a company has to expend this much effort [to get the
benefits], they might as well just move offshore." Id
172. See supra notes 24 & 150.
173. See requirements (1)-(3), supra text accompanying note 152.
174. See requirement (4), supra text accompanying note 152.
175. See supra note 152.
176. See supra note 153.
177. See generally Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venuefor State and
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411,415-16 (1981). In questions of a state's exercise
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posal should be necessary to satisfy GATT only if a company is not
incorporated abroad. Because the FTI proposal does require foreign
incorporation, 178 however, the burdensome foreign presence require-
ments should be eliminated.
Although the requirement of foreign incorporation logically sat-
isfies the first prong of the qualifier, the Contracting Parties may
interpret the general language of the first prong as requiring actual
business activity abroad. If, however, the Contracting Parties
adopted a modified qualifier which replaced the first prong with a
consideration of a tax system's effects, 179 elimination of the burden-
some foreign presence requirements could be justified easily. For-
eign presence would be unnecessary, because there would be no
prerequisite that economic processes be located outside the territory
of the United States.
As the CCCT's FTI proposal is GATT-legal under the qualifier,
the United States should seriously consider adopting it as a replace-
ment for DISC. Once the foreign presence requirements other than
foreign incorporation are eliminated, the proposal will constitute a
GATT-legal method of providing tax benefits to United States
exporting companies that places minimal burdens upon qualifying
taxpayers.180
of jurisdiction over a corporation, consideration of the level of in-state activity is unnec-
essary if the corporation is incorporated in that state. Likewise, in questions of a corpo-
ration's qualification for FTI treatment, consideration of the level of foreign presence
should be unnecessary if the corporation is incorporated in the foreign territory.
178. See supra text accompanying note 150.
179. See supra text at § IIB.6 A Proposed Sixth Defense.
180. On August 4, 1983, Senator Dole (representing himself and Senators Boren,
Symms and Danforth) and Representatives Rostenkowski and Conable introduced the
Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Act of 1983. The proposal incorporated many of the
features of the FTI proposal, but also made substantive and technical changes.
Under the FSC Act, DISC provisions would be replaced by rules that would exempt
from taxation either 17% of the taxable income that a FSC and a related party would
derive from an export transaction or up to 1.35% of gross receipts from the transaction.
The FSC Act would impose substantial foreign presence requirements similar to those
under the FTI proposal. The FSC, a foreign corporation, would be required to: have at
least one director who is not a United States resident; maintain an office outside United
States customs territory; and keep tax records both at that office and in the United States.
The legislation would apply to the export income of an FSC if: (1) the corporation is
managed outside the United States (Ze., if (a) shareholders' meetings and board of direc-
tors' meetings are held outside the United States; and (b) principal bank accounts are
located outside the United States); and (2) economic processes occur outside the United
States (i.e., if (a) the FSC or its agent solicits, negotiates, or forms contracts outside the
United States; and (b) either (1) 50% of the costs for advertising, transportation, collec-
tion, assumption of credit risk, and handling orders relates to FSC activity outside the
United States, or (2) 85% of costs for any two of those five activities relates to activity
outside the United States).
If the FSC or its agent performs all five activities of the economic process test, some
export transactions between the FSC and its related United States taxpayer would qual-
ify for administrative transfer pricing rules. Under these rules, the FSC would earn the
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CONCLUSION
The dispute over the GATT-legality of DISC has been affected
by many developments, the most significant of which, in terms of
future ramifications, is the GATT Council's decision to resolve the
issue by reference to the standards contained in its 1981 qualifier.
This Note demonstrates that the qualifier, by focusing upon a tax
system's structural framework and thus ignoring functional consider-
ations, produces results which do not best serve GATT policy objec-
tives. The qualifier provides a semantic distinction between GATT-
legal and GATT-illegal systems of taxation and disregards the prac-
tical economic effects of such systems. Accordingly, the United
States should defend DISC by arguing that the standard by which
DISC has been condemned is invalid.
In addition, the United States should urge the GATT Council
to modify the qualifier to include a level of taxation test which would
monitor a tax system's effect upon the interests of the Contracting
Parties. If such a modification were adopted, the Contracting Parties
would be assured that the resulting replacement of DISC would bet-
ter accord with GATT policy objectives. Under either the GATT
Council's 1981 qualifier or the suggested modified qualifier, the For-
eign Trading Company Income proposal, without the substantial
foreign presence requirements, is an attractive, GATT-legal DISC
alternative which both serves the interests of the United States and
protects the interests of other Contracting Parties.
Janet B. Rosenblum
greater of: (1) 23% of the taxable income that the FSC and the related party derive from
the transaction; or (2) 1.83% of the gross receipts from the transaction.
The FSC Act would exempt from U.S. taxation a portion of the export income of an
FSC. If the transaction is subject to an administrative transfer pricing rule, the exempt
portion would be seventeen twenty-thirds (17/23) of the FSC's income from the export
transaction. Otherwise, the exempt portion would be 34% of the FSC's export income.
Dividends paid to a United States corporate shareholder from an FSC's export income
would also be tax exempt.
The FSC Act would allow companies with up to $10 million of export receipts to
receive DISC tax deferrals; those companies, however, would have to pay interest on the
deferred tax. In addition, the FSC Act contains special rules for small FSCs with up to
$2.5 million of export receipts. See 129 CONG. REc. H6580-H6582 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1983) (statements of Sens. Rostenkowski and Conable) and 129 CONG. REc. S11,761-66
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983) (statement of Sen. Dole). The proposed FSC Act is printed at
129 CONG. REc. S 11,762-66.
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